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D.C. CODE SECTION 11-2503(a): DISBARMENT
OR BANISHMENT?
State courts are charged with the difficult task of regulating the conduct
of the members of the bar appearing before them.' Disbarment is unques-
tionably the most feared and effective of all the sanctions applied to attor-
neys by these courts.2 Judge Benjamin Cardozo, however, characterized
its purpose as protective rather than punitive: disbarment should act "not
as a punishment but as a method of protecting the public."3 Most jurisdic-
tions,' including the District of Columbia,5 subscribe to then-Judge Car-
l. See generally Steele, Cleaning Up the Legal Profession.- The Power to Discipline-
The Judiciary and the Legislature, 20 ARIz. L. REV. 413 (1978); Note, Disbarment in the
United States. Who Shall Do the Noisome Work? 12 COLUM. J.L. & Soc. PROB. I (1975);
Note, Disbarment.- Non-Professional Conduct Demonstrating Unfitness to Practice, 43 COR-
NELL L.Q. 489, 490 (1958).
In the District of Columbia, D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2501 & 11-2502 authorize the District
of Columbia Court of Appeals to regulate the conduct of attorneys who appear before it.
D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2501(a) to 11-2502 (1981). Section 11-2503(a) specifically provides
for disbarment when an attorney has been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.
Rule 11 of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals implements the above statutory provi-
sions. D.C. CT. APP. R. 11 (1978).
An attorney who is a member of the bar of the District of Columbia is subject to the
disciplinary jurisdiction of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Board of
Professional Responsibility. Of particular interest are the following provisions:
(I) The ABA Code of Professional Responsibility as amended by the District of Columbia
Court of Appeals provides standards for the practice of law in the District. D.C. CODE OF
PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY.
(2) The rules of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals provide disciplinary rules and
procedures. See generally D.C. CT. APP. R. (1978).
(3) D.C. CODE ANN. § 1-2503(a) specifies the disciplinary sanction arising upon conviction
of a crime involving moral turpitude. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2503(a) (1981).
2. Byrchby's Case, 145 Eng. Rep. 187 (Ex. 1584). "[T]he profession of an attorney is of
great importance to an individual, and the prosperity of his whole life may depend on its
exercise. The right to exercise it ought not to be lightly or capriciously taken from him." Ex
parte Burr, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 529, 530 (1824). See generally H. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS
(1953).
3. In re Rouss, 221 N.Y. 81, 84-85, 116 N.E. 782, 785 (1917). See Tucker, Disbarment
and the Supreme Court of the United States, 35 A.B.A. J. 40 (1949).
4. See 7 AM. JUR. 2D.4ttorneys at Law § 26 (1980); In re Ruffalo, 390 U.S. 544, 550
(1968) ("Disbarment, designed to protect the public, is a punishment or penalty imposed on
the lawyer.").
5. See District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146, 148 (D.C. 1975); cf In re
Wild, 361 A.2d 183 (D.C. 1976) (discipline imposed should be commensurate not only with
need to maintain the integrity of profession and protection of public, but with need for
deterrence of other lawyers from engaging in similar conduct).
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dozo's theory.
In the District of Columbia, there are three channels by which an attor-
ney's misconduct may reach the scrutiny of the District of Columbia Court
of Appeals:6 first, a citizen may file a complaint with the Board of Profes-
sional Responsibility ("Board");7 second, a complaint may be indepen-
dently initiated by the Board;8 finally, an attorney may be sanctioned if
convicted of an offense involving moral turpitude9 or "serious crime."'"
Most states have a statute that makes conviction of a felony grounds for
disbarment." The District of Columbia Disbarment Statute goes one step
further and mandates permanent disbarment where the offense involves
moral turpitude.' 2 It also prohibits reinstatement absent a presidential
pardon. This "super disbarment" provision 13 was not applied by the Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals until 1979, although it was enacted in
1973.14 Since 1979, however, the court has attempted to reconcile the stat-
ute with the disciplinary procedures set forth in the appellate court rules
6. See generally D.C. CT. App. R. 1i.
7. Id at § 5.
8. Id at § 4(3)(a).
9. Section 11-2503(a) of the D.C. Code reads:
When a member of the bar of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals is con-
victed of an offense involving moral turpitude, and a certified copy of the convic-
tion is presented to the court, the court shall, pending final determination of an
appeal from the conviction, suspend the member of the bar from practice. Upon
reversal of the conviction the court may vacate or modify the suspension. If a final
judgment of conviction is certified to the court, the name of the member so con-
victed shall be struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereaf-
ter cease to be a member. Upon the granting of a pardon to a member so
convicted, the court may vacate or modify the order of disbarment.
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2503(a) (1981).
10. Section 15(2) of Rule I I defines "serious crime" as "any felony and any lesser crime
a necessary element of which, as determined by the statutory or common law definition of
such crime, involves improper conduct as an attorney, interference with the administration
of justice, false swearing, misrepresentation, fraud, willful failure to file income tax returns,
deceit, bribery, extortion, misappropriation, theft, or an attempt or a conspiracy or solicita-
tion of another to commit a serious crime." D.C. CT. App. R. I I § 15.
II. Note, supra note 1, at 489, 490. See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-272 (1953);
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §§ 6101-6102 (Supp. 1981).
12. Laughlin v. United States, 474 F.2d 444, 447 (D.C. Cir. 1972). It is this case that
stands for the principle that the language of § 11-2503(a) is mandatory.
13. See In re Willcher, 447 A.2d 1198, 1205 (D.C. 1982).
14. Prior to the enactment of the D.C. Court Reform and Criminal Procedure Act of
1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, tit. I, § 111, 84 Stat. 473 (1973), disbarment upon conviction of an
offense involving moral turpitude was not mandatory in its language: "The name of the
member so convicted may thereupon, by order of the court, be struck from the roll of the
members of the bar, and he shall thereafter cease to be a member thereof." D.C. CODE
ANN. § 11-2103 (1967) (repealed by § 11-2503(a)) (emphasis added).
Moreover, the language requiring that the attorney's name be "struck from the rolls and
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and to clarify the moral turpitude standard under the statute. In In re
Willcher, " a case decided this past term, the District of Columbia Court of
Appeals upheld the language of the D.C. Disbarment Statute and found
that where a conflict exists between the statute and the Appellate Court
Disciplinary Rules, the statute supersedes the rules. The court of appeals
also indicated that the statute will be strictly applied. This decision is
likely to have serious and far-reaching effects on the members of the D.C.
Bar.
The controversy arising in Willcher had its genesis in the court's ruling
in In re Foshee.16  Both Foshee and Willcher concerned the violation of
section 11-2606(b). In Foshee, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals
applied Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3) and found that the respondent had
committed a crime involving moral turpitude by accepting money from a
Criminal Justice Act client.'7 In determining the appropriate sanction, the
court considered the mitigating circumstances 18 and concluded that as Fo-
shee's actions did not constitute a "rapacious attempt to exploit the impov-
erished or to cheat the public," a three-month suspension was
appropriate.' 9 The Foshee court, apparently basing its decision solely on
the violation of Disciplinary Rule I-102(A)(3) and the corresponding court
rules, failed to mention the Disbarment Statute, although it was law at the
tue20time.
2
Two years later, in In re Colson,2' the court found that conviction of a
criminal offense, coupled with the Board's finding of moral turpitude
t.. [he] thereafter cease to be a member" was not construed as mandating permanent dis-
barment. See, e.g., In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1170 (D.C. 1979) (Harris, J., dissenting).
The amended statute reads: "[tihe name of the member of the bar so convicted shall be
struck from the roll of the members of the bar and he shall thereafter cease to be a member."
D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2503(a) (1981) (emphasis added).
The statute, as amended, was interpreted as requiring disbarment in In re Colson, 412
A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1979), and as prohibiting reinstatement absent a pardon in In re Kerr, 424
A.2d 94 (D.C. 1980).
15. 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C. 1982).
16. No. S-48-77 (D.C. Mar. 17, 1977). See also District of Columbia Bar v. Foshee, Bar
Docket No. 240-74B (Apr. 12, 1976).
17. DR 1-102(A)(3) provides that an attorney shall not "engage in conduct involving
moral turpitude that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law." D.C. CODE OF PRO-
FESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY. DR 1-102(A)(3) (1979).
18. The court noted that: (i) this was Foshee's first disciplinary proceeding; (2) he be-
lieved his client could afford the fee; and (3) he had not applied for compensation from the
court. Foshee, No. S-48-77, slip op. at 2.
19. Id
20. For a full discussion of Foshee and other cases decided prior to the court's applica-
tion of the statute, see In re Colson, 412 A.2d 1160, 1174 (D.C. 1979) (Harris, J., concurring
but espressing "dissenting views"),
21. 412 A.2d 1160 (D.C. 1979).
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under Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3), mandated disbarment under the
D.C. Disbarment Statute,22 a different disposition from that in Foshee.
The matter had first been referred to the Board, which found that Colson's
conduct violated Disciplinary Rules 1-102(A)(3) and (5)23 and constituted
moral turpitude under the rules.24 The court, relying on D.C. Code section
11-2503, held that "[blecause of legislative fiat. . ., we are precluded from
adopting the Board's recommendation of suspension."25 The court ex-
plained its decision by stating that the finality of the conviction, coupled
with the Board's finding of moral turpitude under the rules, required Fo-
shee's disbarment, as mandated "by the clear language of the statute. 26
Judge Harris dissented strongly, describing the majority opinion as "dis-
ingenuous" because it "makes disbarment appear both routine and inevi-
table. 27 Moreover, he contended that such a result effected major
changes in the court's disciplinary procedures without an acknowledge-
ment that it was doing so. Judge Harris also disagreed with the majority's
construction of the Disbarment Statute, especially in the context of the two
preceding sections of title 11, which grant the court broad discretionary
powers.2" The dissent further noted that the majority's decision was in
22. Charles Colson, a White House aide and Special Counsel to President Nixon, was
convicted of violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1503 (1976), and sentenced to a prison term of one to
three years and fined $5,000. 412 A.2d at 1161-62.
23. DR 1-102(A)(3) prohibits an attorney from "engaging in illegal conduct involving
moral turpitude that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law," and DR 1-102(a)(5)
prohibits conduct prejudicial to the administration of justice.
24. 412 A.2d at 1163.
25. Id.
26. Id
27. Id. at 1163-68 (Harris, J., concurring). Through its statutory construction of § I I-
2503(a), the court created a collateral procedure which is by inference incorporated in the
court rules. This procedure affects, among other things, the scope of review by the court and
the Board. Under Colson, D.C. Ct. App. Rule 11 is superseded by § 11-2503(a) when an
attorney has been convicted of a crime which on its face is "susceptible of a determination
that [it] . . . involve[s] moral turpitude per se." 412 A.2d at 1179. When the court finds a
statute to involve moral turpitude per se, the Board's consideration is limited to whether the
certificate of conviction establishes that "the attorney, in fact, has been convicted of the
crime." 1d. at 1165. Disbarment will be automatic if the attorney has been convicted of an
offense which has been held as a matter of law to involve moral turpitude. However, when a
crime is not susceptible of a determination that it involves moral turpitude per se, the Board
will admit "evidence that goes to the moral implications of the particular respondent's acts,
as a way of determining whether his particular offense involved moral turpitude . Id.
at 1180.
28. Section 11-2501 authorizes the D.C. Court of Appeals to "make such rules as it
deems proper respecting the examination, qualification, and admission of persons to mem-
bership in its bar, and their censure, suspensions and expulsions." Section 11-2502 provides
that the court "may censure, suspend from practice, or expel a member of its bar for crime,
misdemeanor, fraud, deceit, malpractice, professional misconduct, or conduct prejudicial to
19831 1041
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conflict not only with the court rules providing for reinstatement, but also
with other provisions as well.29
Judge Ferran concurred with the majority, maintaining that the statute
was not inconsistent with preceding sections and, to the extent that Rule 11
conflicts with the statute, the rule must yield. 3' The concurrence, however,
reserved judgment on the issue of reinstatement-an issue that would ap-
pear prominently soon thereafter.3 '
The Colson court's interpretation of the statute thus appears to have re-
moved any discretion from the court or the Board to consider particular
facts or mitigating circumstances where the attorney has been convicted of
a crime involving moral turpitude.32 The reinstatement issue,33 however,
the administration of justice." D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 11-2501 to 11-2502 (1981) (emphasis
added).
29. The dissent referred to three provisions in the court rules:
(1) Section 7(3) of Rule 11 provides that the court adopt the Board's recommendation "un-
less to do so would foster a tendency toward inconsistent dispositions for comparable con-
duct or otherwise would be unwarranted." D.C. CT. App. R. II § 7(3).
(2) Section 21 of Rule 11 permits application for reinstatement after five years. Although
Rule I l was adopted after § 11-2503(a), there is not restrictive language in the rule to indi-
cate that reinstatement is barred in certain instances. The burden of proof rests with the
petitioner to demonstrate by clear and convincing evidence that he has the "moral qualifica-
tions, competency, and learning in law required for readmission and that his reassumption
of the practice of law will not be detrimental to the integrity and standing of the Bar, or to
the administration of justice, or subversive to the public interest." D.C. CT. App. R. 11
§ 21(5) (1978).
(3) Section 15. See supra note 10.
30. Colson, 412 A.2d at 1168 (Ferran, J., concurring).
31. Commenting on the language of § 11-2503(a) requiring that an attorney disbarred
under § 11-2503(a) "shall be struck from the roll," Judge Ferran suggested that the language
"does not necessarily imply that such expulsion must be permanent. Even if it does, the
constitutionality of such a result would have to be considered. Finally, if permanent disbar-
ment were constitutional, we obviously would have to reconsider our reinstatement rule in
light of the statute." Colson, 412 A.2d at 1184 (Ferran, J., concurring); cf. In re Kerr, 424
A.2d 94 (D.C. 1980).
32. See District of Columbia Bar v. Kleindienst, 345 A.2d 146 (D.C. 1975) (court's role
is to determine continued fitness of attorney to practice by scrutinizing circumstances sur-
rounding his conduct). It is interesting to note that the ABA draft of the Model Rules of
Professional Conduct has entirely eliminated the term "moral turpitude" from the Rules.
Rule 8.4 which would essentially replace DR I-102(A)(3) reads in part as follows:
It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:
(a) violate or attempt to violate the rules of Professional Conduct, knowingly assist
or induce another to do so, or to do so through the acts of another;
(b) commit a criminal or fraudulent act that reflects adversely on the lawyer's hon-
esty, trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer in other respects;
(c) state or imply an ability to influence improperly a government agency or official
The comment following Rule 8.4 supports the exclusion of moral turpitude:
it is [a] concept. . .[which] . . .can be construed to include offenses concerning
1042 [Vol. 32:1038
Disbarment or Banishment?
on which the court had previously reserved judgment, was given an ex-
tended hearing several months later in In re Kerr.34 Kerr was convicted in
1972 of mail fraud, a violation of Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3), and sen-
tenced to two years imprisonment. She was subsequently disbarred, and
applied for reinstatement in 1978. After considering her conduct subse-
quent to disbarment, the Board recommended reinstatement upon her
completion of a course in legal ethics.35 The District of Columbia Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that because the Disbarment Statute was con-
trolling, her application must be rejected. 36 The Kerr court found the lan-
guage of the statute clear,37 and therefore held that it did not have the
statutory authority to reinstate an attorney convicted of an offense involv-
ing moral turpitude.38 The result of Kerr is that the reinstatement provi-
sion of the District of Columbia court rules no longer applies to
some matters of personal morality, such as adultery and comparable offenses, that
have no specific connection to fitness for the practice of law. Although a lawyer is
personally answerable to the entire criminal law, a lawyer should be professionally
answerable only for offenses that indicate lack of those characteristics relevant to
law practice.
See Bradway, Moral Turpitude as the Criterion of Offenses that Jusqfy Disbarment, 24 CAL.
L. REV. 9 (1935). See also Jordan v. DeGeorge, 341 U.S. 223, reh'g denied, 341 U.S. 956
(1951) (Jackson, J., dissenting) (moral turpitude is an undefined and undefinable standard).
33. For a discussion of the reinstatement issue, see infra note 38 and accompanying text.
34. 424 A.2d 94 (D.C. 1980).
35. Id at 97. In the evidence presented to the Board, Kerr presented a picture of reha-
bilitation: Subsequent to her conviction, she had obtained a graduate degree in psychology,
enrolled in a post-doctoral clinical psychology program, and had testified as an expert wit-
ness at the request of local attorneys. Id. at 96.
36. Id at 99. Kerr was convicted in 1972, seven years before Colson. Although she had
been disbarred pursuant to § 15 of the court rules, the court relied upon § 11-2503(a) in
ruling on her application for reinstatement. Id at 97 n.14.
37. Id at 97.
38. Id at 98; cf. Application of Dimenstein, 410 A.2d 491 (Conn. Supp. 1979) (in com-
menting on statutes which provide for permanent disbarment for certain offenses, court con-
cluded that "permanent" meant "indefinite," or until circumstances warrant a change).
Judge Ferran, dissenting in Kerr, provided a conceptual framework that would allow the
court more flexibility in addressing applications for reinstatement when disbarment occurs
under § 11-2503(a). See Kerr, 424 A.2d at 99 (Ferran, J., dissenting). See also In re Ken-
nan, 37 N.E.2d 516 (Mass. 1941). Judge Ferran felt that unless the court exercised such
flexibility, the inherent assumption is that the attorney disbarred under § 11-2503(a) will
never be capable of rehabilitation, an assumption that contradicts the most basic underpin-
ning of our system of justice. See In re Hiss, 333 N.E.2d 429, 434 (Mass. 1975) ("There is
always the potentiality for reform, and fundamental fairness demands that the disbarred
attorney have opportunity to adduce proofs."). Although the Maryland disciplinary statute
contains language similar to the District of Columbia's, in reinstatement proceedings the
Maryland courts consider four factors: (1) the nature and circumstances of the original mis-
conduct; (2) the subsequent conduct and reformation of the attorney; (3) the present charac-
ter of the attorney; and (4) the present qualifications and competence of the attorney to
practice law. In re Braverman, 316 A.2d 246 (Md. 1974).
1983] 1043
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disbarment under the Disbarment Statute. It is this issue which directly
confronted the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in In re Willcher: 9
whether violation of section 11-2606(b) requires an attorney's permanent
disbarment under section 11-2503(a).
Willcher, an attorney appointed under the Criminal Justice Act, was
convicted of unlawful solicitation of money from an indigent client, a vio-
lation of section 11-2606(b). 40 After Willcher's conviction was affirmed on
appeal, the court of appeals referred the matter to the Board to determine
whether the offense involved moral turpitude under section 11-2503(a)
and, if not, whether Willcher's actual conduct involved moral turpitude.4 '
The Board found that violation of section 11-2606(b) was not a crime in-
volving moral turpitude per se.42 Upon referral from the Board, the hear-
ing committee determined that although Willcher's conduct did not
constitute a violation under the Disbarment Statute, it was a violation of
Disciplinary Rule 1-102(A)(3). 4' The Board, however, stated that if sec-
tion 11-2606(b) was not a violation of the statute, it followed that it was not
a violation of the disciplinary rule."4
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals rejected the Board's finding
and held that demands of money from a Criminal Justice Act client is a
fraud on both the client and the judicial system which falls "squarely
within the definition of an offense inherently involving moral turpitude.
'45
Chief Judge Newman concurred with the majority in affirming the court's
construction of the statute. He recognized, however, that the mandated
disbarment sanction and the inflexible concept of moral turpitude created
a dilemma for the Board.46 Willcher therefore provides-whether inten-
tionally or inadvertently-an analytical framework within which to deter-
mine whether attorney misconduct falls within the disbarment statute, and
39. 447 A.2d 1198 (D.C. 1982).
40. 447 A.2d at 1198. Section 1 1-2606(b) provides:
Any person compensated, or entitled to be compensated, for any services ren-
dered under this chapter who shall seek, ask, demand, receive, or offer to receive,
any money, goods, or services in return therefore from or on behalf of a defendant
or respondent shall be fined not more than $1000 or imprisoned not more than one
year or both. D.C. CODE ANN. § 11-2606(b) (1981).
41. Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1199.
42. Id
43. Id
44. Id The Board adopted the hearing committee's conclusion which found that
Willcher's conduct, "while plainly inimical to the standards of the profession, did not ...
sink to the level of enormity requiring eternal disbarment . Id at 1200.
45. Id. at 1200-01.
46. The Supplementary Opinion of Lawrence J. Latto . . .makes clear that the
Board and its Hearing Committees 'have struggled' with the meaning of 'moral
turpitude' in section 11-2503(a) since our decisions in Colson and Kerr. This
1044 [Vol. 32:1038
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the procedural steps required where the statute and court rules overlap or
conflict.
The Willcher court established an analysis under the statute which re-
quires three successive levels of review.47 Once an attorney has been con-
victed of an offense, the initial inquiry by the court of appeals is whether
the offense involves moral turpitude per se. The threshold focus is on the
type of crime committed. If the crime involves moral turpitude as a matter
of law, then the Board's consideration is limited to whether the certificate
of conviction establishes that the attorney has been convicted of the crime.
The particular circumstances and nature of the acts engaged in by the at-
torney are immaterial.48
Where the court does not find moral turpitude per se, the Disbarment
Statute then requires that the Board analyze the language of the statute
and its underlying elements to determine whether the offense involves
moral turpitude. If the violation is not found to involve moral turpitude,
the Board must hold evidentiary hearings analyzing the attorney's conduct
and role in the commission of the offense. These instances require a case-
by-case review. Although the court possesses no flexibility where the of-
fense has been adjudged to involve moral turpitude per se, it appears the
Board may have some discretion in its analysis of the underlying conduct
and resulting recommendation. Willcher's rejection of the Board's finding
that the statute had not been violated indicates, however, that the court
will not necessarily follow the Board's recommendations where the Dis-
barment Statute controls.49 The rule requiring the court to adopt the
Board's findings and recommendations except where they prove inconsis-
tent, unwarranted, or unsupported by substantial evidence is, therefore, no
,struggle' results from a reluctance to impose the mandated sanction of 'super dis-
barment.'
While I fully understand the desire to enhance flexibility over mandatory sanc-
tions ... it is not the province of the Board, the Hearing Committees ... or this
court, to construe the statute based upon disagreement with or disapproval of, the
mandated sanction.
Id. at 1201 (Newman, C.J., concurring).
47. If the court of appeals does not find that violation of the statute involves moral
turpitude per se, Willcher then requires that the Board look to the language of the statute
under which the attorney was convicted and the underlying elements of the crime. Only
after concluding that the statute does not involve moral turpitude will the Board look to the
conduct involved in the commission of the crime. Nevertheless, the court may, as it did in
Willcher, disregard the Board's recommendation. Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1199.
48. For example, had the Foshee court considered the respondent's crime under § I I-
2503(a) and held that it was one inherently involving moral turpitude, or had the Board
found it so, subsequent convictions under § 11-2606(b), such as occurred in Willcher, would
result in automatic disbarment without the need for an evidentiary hearing.
49. Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1198.
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longer applicable.5" The court has effectively removed much of the
Board's authority, while indicating that proceedings under the statute are
not necessarily subject to the court rules.
Underpinning the Disbarment Statute is the "moral turpitude" standard
against which an offense is judged.5 For the Board to determine that an
offense inherently involves moral turpitude, moral turpitude must be
clearly defined. A clear definition is also necessary to determine whether
conduct in the commission of an offense involves one of the elements of
moral turpitude. The Colson court used a variety of definitions, some very
narrow-"the act denounced by the statute offends the generally accepted
moral code of mankind"" 2-and others much more expansive-"conduct
contrary to justice, honesty, modesty or good morals."53 In contrast, the
Willcher court attempted to resolve the inherent ambiguity of the phrase
by providing a more precise definition. The court noted that when the
term is applied in the context of attorney misconduct, it connotes a fraudu-
lent54 or dishonest intent.55 Moreover, the court stated that moral turpi-
tude includes fraud. Therefore, a crime in which an intent to defraud is an
essential element involves moral turpitude. It further concluded that any
offenses involving intentional dishonesty for personal gain are also crimes
involving moral turpitude.5 6 While the term's ambiguity was not entirely
removed, the Willcher court at least narrowed its scope.5 7
While the definition of moral turpitude was critical to the case, its more
controversial aspect was the court's finding that the Disbarment Statute
bars any consideration of reinstatement absent a pardon. The precedents
on which this part of Willcher was decided are, however, by no means
50. D.C. CT. APP. R. II § 7.
5 1. See supra note 32.
52. Colson, 412 A.2d at 1168.
53. Id. (citing BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY (4th ed. 1981)).
54. Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1200 (citing Iowa State Bar Ass'n v. Kraschel, 260 Iowa 187,
197, 148 N.W.2d 621, 627 (1967)).
55. Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1200 (citing Committee of Legal Ethics v. Scherr, 149 W. Va.
721, 726, 143 S.E.2d 141, 147 (1965)).
56. Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1200 (quoting In re Hallinan, 43 Cal. 2d 243, 247, 272 P.2d
768, 771 (1954), appeal after remand, 48 Cal. 2d 52, 307 P.2d I (1957)).
57. Prior to Willcher, there was also the question whether the term "moral turpitude"
should receive the same construction under the statute and under the disciplinary code, i.e.,
whether conduct in commission of a crime in violation of DR 1-102(A)(3) would automati-
cally be considered a violation of the statute. The answer appears to be that the statute and
rule will be construed similarly in the same context. See Willcher, 447 A.2d at 1200 & n.8
(Newman, C.J., concurring).
In an unpublished memorandum opinion, the court confirmed that "the term 'moral tur-
pitude' should receive the same construction under section I 1-2503(a) and Disciplinary Rule
I-102(A)(3)." In re Price, No. M-l 19-82, slip op. at I (D.C. Nov. 3, 1982).
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consistent with each another. In Colson, Judge Ferran noted that if per-
manent disbarment was found to be constitutional, the court would have
to reconsider the reinstatement rule in light of the statute. 58 A few months
after Colson, however, the court held in Kerr that although Kerr had been
disbarred under section 11-2103, the predecessor section to 11-2503(a), her
disbarment resulted from conviction of an offense involving moral turpi-
tude. The court held, therefore, that it did not have the statutory authority
to reinstate her.59 In reaching this conclusion, the Kerr court thereby
found the statute constitutional. Relying on Kerr, the Willcher court,
which found no ambiguity in the language of the statute, held that respon-
dent Wiflcher was permanently disbarred.
In reaching its conclusions, the Willcher court emphasized the clarity of
the language of the statute. Yet several interpretations have been posited
that appear to support a contrary result: (1) the pardon provision is not to
be read as the sole method of reinstatement, but only as one method;6" (2)
disbarment and reinstatement are two separate and distinct procedures,
and reinstatement is a new procedure for admission; (3) the conflict result-
ing from the reinstatement provisions in the court rule and the court's con-
struction of the statute, given that the court rule was adopted subsequent to
section 11-2503(a), indicates that the statute does not preclude reinstate-
ment;6' and (4) Congress never intended such a narrow reading of the
statute.62
Even if the Willcher court were correct in finding the statute constitu-
tional, the policy question remains whether mandated sanctions further the
cause of justice. The major difference between the pre- and post-Colson
decisions is not the court's ability to apply the appropriate sanction, but
the court's discretion in weighing the facts and circumstances of each case.
The court, by its own hand, has, in effect, abdicated this responsibility.
Had Foshee been decided pursuant to the new statute, neither the court
nor the Board would have been permitted to consider mitigating circum-
stances. Yet, it would be unjust to conclude that Foshee should have been
disbarred, as was Willcher. Even without the statute, it is likely that
Willcher's prior disciplinary record and his demand of money from an
indigent client would have led to his disbarment. Nevertheless, the court's
58. Colson, 412 A.2d 1180 n.2 (Ferran, J., concurring).
59. Kerr, 424 A.2d at 98; cf. id. at 102 (Ferran, J., dissenting) (statutory language con-
cerning reinstatement is ambiguous).
60. Id at 98.
61. Colson, 412 A.2d at 1172, 1175 (Harris, J., dissenting).
62. Id at 1177. See also Kerr, 424 A.2d at 102 (Ferran, J., dissenting). Unfortunately,
there is no legislative history on § 11-2503(a) for the court or its critics to look in support of
an alternative construction.
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decision in Willcher is a signal that the court will not recognize degrees of
moral turpitude, no matter how slight the offense or how strongly the facts
and circumstances dictate a less severe result than disbarment. Under sec-
tion 11-2503(a), the court will order permanent disbarment. If the court
adheres strictly to this ruling, a case will not be decided on its particular
facts and circumstances, but rather by a rigid rule which has a weak ra-
tional foundation.
There appear to be two ways to deal effectively and fairly with this situa-
tion. The first is to repeal the statute and simultaneously amend the court
rules to address more directly the need for strict enforcement of attorney
misconduct. The second is to amend the court rules to bring them into
conformity with the statute. Avoiding conflicts between the rules and the
statute would mitigate potentially harsh results.
Michal Cline
